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IN THE UTAH COURT OF APPEALS 
-ooOoo 
SHARON GARLAND, ) 
) APPELLANT'S BRIEF 
Plaintiff/Appellant. ) 
v. ) 
JAMES KENT GARLAND, ) 
) Case No. 880344-CA 
Defendant/Respondent. ) Category 14(b) 
ooOoo 
JURISDICTION AND NATURE OF CASE 
This Court has jurisdiction over the matter under 
Section 78-2a-3(g), Utah Code Annotated (effective January 1, 
1988), in that it is an appeal from final orders in a divorce 
proceeding. The Court entered its Findings of Fact and 
Conclusions of Law and a Decree of Divorce on May 3, 1988. The 
Decree of Divorce awarded custody of the parties' children, made 
provision for payment of child support, ordered the payment 
of alimony, made division of the parties' assets and directed 
payment of their liabilities. The Decree of Divorce awarded a 
Judgment in favor of the Plaintiff and against the Defendant in 
the amount of $212,000.00 to make the division of the marital 
estate equal. The Court ordered that interest would not accrue 
on the judgment which was awarded to her and ordered that each of 
the parties would pay their own attorney's fees. 
ISSUES PRESENTED FOR APPEAL 
Plaintiff has appealed from that portion of the Decree 
of Divorce which ordered that the judgment awarded to her shall 
not accrue interest unless any payments become delinquent and 
from the Order directing that each of the parties shall pay their 
own attorney's fees and costs which they have incurred in these 
proceedings. The issues presented for review are: 
1. The Court abused its discretion by ordering that the 
judgment entered in favor of the Plaintiff and against the 
Defendant shall not accrue interest unless any payment becomes 
delinquent. 
2. The Court abused its discretion by failing to award 
the Plaintiff a reasonable attorney's fee and such costs as she 
may have incurred in these proceedings. 
This Court will be required to interpret Utah Code 
Annotated §15-1-4, which states: 
"Any judgment rendered on a lawful contract shall 
conform thereto and shall bear the interest agreed 
upon by the parties, which shall be specified in 
the judgment: other judgments shall bear interest 
at the rate of 12 percent per annum." 
STATEMENT OF THE CASE AND STATEMENT OF FACTS 
1. The parties in this matter were married on July 10, 
1976. A Decree of Divorce was entered dissolving that marriage 
on May 3, 1988. Two children were born during the marriage, now 
ages 8 and 10. (Findings of Fact and Conclusions of Law, Record, 
p. 181-190.) 
2. At the time of the divorce, Mr. Garland was self-
employed and had a record of earnings which he had represented to 
be as high as $8,000.00 per month and not less than $6,000.00 per 
month. (Plaintiff's Exhibit P-26, attached hereto as Exhibit 
"A".) 
3. Mrs. Garland was employed during the marriage by the 
Defendant earning approximately $500.00 per month. The Court 
found that it was not likely that the employment of the Plaintiff 
would continue after the termination of the marriage. The 
Plaintiff was enrolled at the University of Utah as a full-time 
student and intended to continue that enrollment. The Plaintiff 
was found to be in need of alimony to continue to support her in 
a manner to which she had become accustomed, to complete her edu-
cation and to acclimate her to the work force. (Plaintiff's 
Exhibit 42, attached hereto as Exhibit "B"; Findings of Fact No. 
5, Record, p. 182.) 
4. Mrs. Garland's total income after divorce will be 
$2,000.00 per month: $1,000.00 alimony and $1,000.00 child 
support. (Decree, paras. 3 and 6, Record, p. 182.) 
5. Mrs. Garland has monthly expenses of $3,495.00. 
(Plaintiff's Exhibit P-43, attached as Exhibit "C".) 
6. After consideration of the marital assets, the Court 
awarded Mr. Garland the vast majority of the existing assets at 
$505,000.00 and the liabilities related thereto equaling 
$143,000.00; Mrs. Garland was awarded $8,637.42 in existing 
assets, ordered to pay a liability of $53,000.00, and was awarded 
a judgment against Mr. Garland in the amount of $212,000.00 
payable over a ten-year period. [Findings of Fact Nos. 8 and 9; 
Record, p. 183-184;)(Conclusions of Law Nos. 8 and 10; Record, p. 
187-188.)(Decree, paras. 8, 9 and 14; Record, p. 192, 193 and 
194.)1 
7. The Court concluded that the judgment awarded to the 
Plaintiff to equalize the marital estate should not accumulate 
interest and entered its Order as follows: 
"A judgment shall be entered in favor of the 
Plaintiff and against the Defendant in the amount 
of $212,000.00, to make the division of the marital 
estate equal. The Defendant shall be required to 
pay to the Plaintiff $12,000.00 in cash by July 1, 
1988. The Defendant shall further be directed to 
pay $20,000.00 to the Plaintiff on or before the 
31st day of December, 1988, and $20,000.00 each 
year thereafter for ten years until the judgment is 
paid in full. The judgment shall not accrue 
interest unless any payment becomes delinquent. In 
the event any payment shall become delinquent, then 
interest shall accrue on the judgment of the normal 
interest rate allowed by law." (Findings of Fact 
and Conclusions of Law, Record, p. 189; Decree of 
Divorce, Record, p. 194.) 
8. The Plaintiff incurred attorney's fees in the amount 
of approximately $12,000.00 in her prosecution of this divorce 
proceeding. However, the Court found that the Defendant was 
awarded principally all of the assets which were acquired during 
the marriage and that he would have a substantial liability owing 
to the Plaintiff. The Court found that the Defendant is going to 
have a difficult time making payments on the outstanding judgment 
and it will not be any easier for the Defendant to pay attorney's 
fees than it is for the Plaintiff. Based upon those facts, the 
Court concluded that the Plaintiff should be required to pay her 
own attorney's fees even though she had no employment and such 
fees would be required to be paid from her portion of the marital 
estate. (Findings of Fact and Conclusions of Law, Record, p. 
185, 186.) 
9. The Plaintiff had no ability to pay her attorney's 
fees without using portions of the marital estate. (February 17, 
1988, Transcript, pp. 4,5; Plaintiff's Exhibit "D".) 
10. The attorney's fees which were incurred by the 
Plaintiff were reasonably incurred based upon community standards 
and the services required for presentation of the Plaintiff's 
case to the Court for a two-day trial. (Transcript of pro-
ceedings, February 17, 1988; pp. 5-7; Plaintiff's Exhibit 50, 
attached hereto as Exhibit "E".) 
11. The Findings of Fact and Conclusions of Law and the 
Decree of Divorce were entered in this matter and signed by Judge 
Daniels on May 4, 1988. 
12. The Plaintiff filed this appeal from the Decree of 
Divorce on May 23, 1988. 
SUMMARY OF LEGAL ARGUMENTS 
1. The Court abused its discretion by ordering that the 
Judgment entered in favor of the Plaintiff and against the 
Defendant shall not accrue interest unless any payment becomes 
delinquent. Judgments entered in the State of Utah shall accrue 
interest at the statutory rate provided by Utah Code Annotated, 
§15-1-4. 
2. The Court abused its discretion by failing to award 
the Plaintiff attorney's fees when she was without any source 
of income, or any other means except the use of her share of the 
marital estate to make payment of those fees. The Court failed 
to consider the comparative abilities of the parties to make 
payment of attorney's fees and costs, the fees made necessary by 
Defendant's actions. 
LEGAL ARGUMENT 
A. Standards of Appellate Review of Divorce 
Proceedings. 
It is well established that a trial court is permitted 
considerable discretion in adjusting the financial and property 
interests of the parties in a divorce proceeding. Savage v. 
Savage, 658 P.2d 1201 (Utah 1983); Cox v. Cox, 532 P.2d 994 (Utah 
1975); Mitchell v. Mitchell, 527 P.2d 1359 (Utah 1974). However, 
the trial court's discretion is circumscribed by legal principles 
which prevent unjust results: The Orders shall be overturned or 
modified on appeal where "the evidence clearly preponderates to 
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the contrary, or the trial court has abused its discretion or 
misapplied principles of law." Fletcher v. Fletcher, 615 P.2d 
1218, 1222 (Utah 1980). In divorce proceedings, the appellate 
court may review both the facts and law upon which the trial 
court made its rulings. Boals v. Boals, 664 P.2d 1191 (Utah 
1983). 
B. The Trial Court Abused Its Discretion by Failing to 
Award Plaintiff Statutory Interest on the Judgment. 
The Court awarded Mrs. Garland a judgment in the amount 
of $212,000.00 in making an equal division of the marital estate 
but held that interest should not accrue on that judgment "unless 
any payment becomes delinquent." (Divorce Decree, para. 14; 
Record, p. 194.) The Court's failure to award interest is a clear 
abuse of discretion. 
Utah law requires that all judgments bear interest at 
the rate of 12 percent per annum unless otherwise specified by 
contract. [Section 15-1-4, Utah Code Ann. (1953, as amended)]. 
The Utah Supreme Court has held that Section 15-1-4 applies to 
judgments granted pursuant to a Decree of Divorce and that the 
trial court does not possess the equitable powers to stay accrual 
of interest. Stroud v. Stroud, 84 Ut. Adv. Rep. 7 (filed 
June 10, 1988). 
This Court should reverse the trial court and instruct 
the trial court to amend the Decree such that interest accrues at 
the statutory rate on the unpaid principal balance from the date 
of the Decree of Divorce until the Judgment is paid in full. 
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C. The Court Abused Its Discretion and Misapplied Law 
to Facts by Failing to Award Mrs. Garland Attorney's Fees. 
The Utah Supreme Court has held that the primary issue 
to be addressed when awarding attorney's fees is need of the 
requesting party and the other party's ability to pay; when 
"need" is established, the requesting party must demonstrate the 
reasonableness of the fees requested. Beals v. Beals, 682 P.2d 
862, 864 (Utah 1984); Kerr v. Kerr, 610 P.2d 1380, 1384 (Utah 
1980); Christensen v. Christensen, 667 P.2d 592, 596 (Utah 1983). 
In the Beals case, supra., the Court upheld the trial 
court's award of attorney's fees based upon Mrs. Beals' financial 
need which was demonstrated by the disparity in incomes between 
Mrs. Beals and Mr. Beals. The Court stated: 
"Mrs. Beals' testimony demonstrated her financial 
need. In the three years previous to the trial, 
her yearly income averaged only $6,500.00. Mr. 
Beals' income was well over $50,000.00 for those 
years." 
Beals v. Beals, at p. 864. Further, the Beals court addressed 
the reasonableness of Mrs. Beals' attorney's time involved by 
reviewing the difficulty caused by the Defendant Mr. Beals. 
"The record demonstrates the necessity of the time 
spent. Throughout the pre-trial stage, Mr. Beals 
consistently refused to cooperate in retaining 
counsel and in providing discovery, and was 
ultimately jailed for contempt because of his refu-
sal to be deposed. This non-cooperation required 
[Mrs. Beals1 attorney] to spend extra hours in com-
pelling discovery and in preparing for the case. 
The trial judge was familiar with these facts at 
the time of trial. We, therefore, affirm the 
$8,812.73 award to [Mrs. Beals' attorney]." 
Beals v. Beals, at p. 864-865. 
In the case before the Court, Mrs. Garland unequivocally 
demonstrated her need in an award for attorney's fees. At the 
trial, Mrs. Garland testified as follows: 
"Q. Mrs. Garland, do you have the ability, 
personally, to pay those fees (attorney's fees)? 
"A. No. 
"Q. Are you in need of assistance from your 
husband to pay those fees? 
"A. Yes. 
"Q. Is it your desire that the Court enter an 
Order directing him to pay those fees? 
"A. Yes." 
(Transcript of February 17, 1988, proceeding, excerpts attached 
as Exhibit "D".) 
As support for the award of attorney's fees, Mrs. 
Garland adequately demonstrated that her husband had signifi-
cantly greater income, that Mr. Garland had a much greater 
ability to pay attorney's fees and greater potential income. 
Plaintiff's gross income for the three years prior to the divorce 
were respectively, $7,010.00, $5,300.00 and $5,413.00. 
(Plaintiff's Exhibit P-42, attached as Exhibit "A".) At the time 
of the Decree of Divorce, Mrs. Garland was a student and had been 
employed by her husband; however, the Court found that it was 
likely her employment would end after termination of the marriage. 
(Finding of Fact No. 5, Record, p. 182.) 
In contrast, Mr. Garland's income for the four prior 
years was very substantial. For the years 1984, 1985, 1986 and 
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1987, based upon exhibits admitted at trial, Mr. Garland's income 
was respectively not less than $62,000.00, but not greater than 
$90,000.00; not less than $37,000.00, and not greater than 
$87,000.00; not less than $70,000.00, and not greater than 
$75,000.00; and not less than $72,000.00, and not greater than 
$96,000.00. (Plaintiff's Exhibit P-26, attached as Exhibit "B".) 
The clear disparity in income alone merits the award of attor-
ney's fees, especially where the Court has found that Mrs. 
Garland will no longer be employed and have a source of income 
after the divorce. 
Regarding the reasonableness and foundation for attor-
ney's fees, Plaintiff's counsel submitted Exhibit P-50, a cover 
sheet which had attached detailed and itemized listings for all 
time devoted to the case. (Attached as Exhibit "E".) Mr. 
Peterson further laid complete foundation for his hourly billing 
rate of $110.00 per hour, his time in practice and the necessity 
for hours spent. (See excerpts of Transcript of February 17, 
1988, proceeding, p. 3-7, attached as Exhibit "D".) 
The number of hours spent by Plaintiff's counsel was 
necessitated by the difficulty of the case and lack of coopera-
tion of Mr. Garland during the proceedings. The difficulty with 
Mr. Garland is well demonstrated by the February 17, 1988, 
transcript of proceeding attached as Exhibit "F". The transcript 
relates to a hearing held immediately prior to trial regarding a 
Subpoena served on Knutson Mortgage necessitated by Mr. Garland's 
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refusal to turn over financial statements submitted to the lender 
when applying for a home mortgage. The entire hearing could 
easily have been avoided by Mr. Garland simply turning over to 
Plaintiff's counsel documents which were clearly discoverable. 
In light of the Savage v. Savage case, supra., it is 
difficult to see how the trial court failed to award Mrs. Garland 
her attorney's fees. In the Savage case, the Court upheld an 
award of attorney's fees to the Plaintiff-wife. Addressing the 
issue, the Court held: 
"Absent an abuse of discretion, we will not second 
guess the trial court on this issue where there is 
sufficient evidence on the reasonableness of the 
fee, the need of the Plaintiff and the relative 
superiority of the Defendant's ability to pay. 
(Citation omitted.) In addition to the Savage 
stock and his $133,000.00 annual income, the 
Defendant received marketable stock worth 
$22,000.00, and a note worth $144,000.00. The only 
way the Plaintiff would be able to pay the large 
fees incurred in this litigation would be to sell 
her house or furnishings or to liquidate securities 
given to her by her parents. Her only income is 
the $3,500.00 per month from the Defendant and 
approximately $7,000.00 per year in dividends." 
Savage, at p. 1206. 
Mrs. Garland's only income after the Decree of Divorce 
will be $2,000.00: $1,000.00 in child support and $1,000.00 in 
alimony. Her monthly expenses are $3,495.00. (Exhibit P-43, 
attached as Exhibit "C".) Clearly, the only way the Plaintiff 
could possibly pay her own attorney's fees would be from the pro-
perty settlement which the Court awarded to her. There is no 
other possible avenue to pay the fees. 
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Reviewing the assets which were awarded the parties, Mr. 
Garland received $504,422.00 in assets against $155,662.76 in 
liabilities. (Findings of Fact Nos. 8 and 9, Record, pp. 183, 
184; Conclusions of Law Nos. 8 and 10, Record, pp. 187, 188; 
Decree, paras. 7 and 9, Record, pp. 192, 193.) Mrs. Garland 
received $8,637.62 in assets against a $53,000.00 debt plus a 
$212,000.00 judgment against Mr. Garland payable at $32,000.00 
the first year with the balance payable in equal annual 
installments over the following ten years. (Id.; Decree, para. 
14, Record, p. 194.) Two of the three pieces of real property 
awarded to Mr. Garland, the 16th West property, and the Windsor 
Street property, are each income producing properties which would 
carry themselves and not deplete the cash flow of Mr. Garland. 
Based upon the Savage case, the Court should enter an 
Order reversing the trial court and award Mrs. Garland $12,000.00 
in attorney's fees. As in Savage, Mrs. Garland has only 
$2,000.00 per month income, which must be expended upon monthly 
debts of approximately $3,500.00, and Mr. Garland was awarded 
significant property while the only possible source for Mrs. 
Garland to pay attorney's fees is depletion of the property award 
made to her by the Court. 
CONCLUSION 
The trial court abused its discretion and committed 
reversible error by failing to award Mrs. Garland interest on the 
Judgment against Mr. Garland. Further, the disparity in income, 
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Mr. Garland's superior earning capacity and ability to pay 
clearly demonstrates the need for an award of attorney's fees to 
Mrs. Garland. 
DATED this / * day of August, 1988. 
LITTLEFIELD & PETERSON 
AUL WOOD 
ttorneys for Plaintiff 
CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE 
I hereby certify that I caused to be mailed a true and 
correct copy of the foregoing Appellant's Brief to James Kent 
Garland, Respondent, 6936 Promenade Drive, Salt Lake City, Utah 
84121, this 4M day of August, 1988. 
tjLtitjJl 
28965-28968 
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EXHIBIT "A" 
banana v. banana 
DEFENDANT'S GROSS INCOME 
1984 
FROM 1984 TAX RETURN (P-6) 
FROM 1984 TAX RETURN (P-9) 
FROM DEFENDANT'S ANSWERS 
TO INTERROGATORIES 
1985 
FROM 1985 TAX RETURN ( P - 7 ) 
FROM 1985 TAX RETURN (P-10 ) 
FROM PERSONAL FINANCIAL 
STATEMENT 1 1 / 2 / 8 5 (P-20) 
FROM ANSWERS 
TO INTERROGATORIES 
1986 
FROM 1986 TAX RETURN 
($75,510 less $5,300)(P-ll) 
FROM CREDIT APPLICATION 
DATED 8/86 (P-21) 
FROM ANSWERS 
TO INTERROGATORIES 
YEAR 
90,868.00 
62,674.00 
62,674.00 
$87,690.00 
37,690.00 
75,510.00 
37,690.00 
70,210.00 
MONTH 
7,272.33 
5,222.83 
5,222.83 
$7,307.50 
3,140.83 
6,291.66 
3,140.83 
$ 5 , 8 5 0 . 0 0 '$604 " ^ 
$ 1 4 , 7 3 0 . 0 0 
7 5 , 5 1 0 . 0 0 6 , 2 9 2 . 5 0 
1987 
FROM CREDIT APPLICATION 
DATED 3/2/87 (P-22) 
FROM CREDIT APPLICATED 
DATED 7/87 (P-23) 
SGI 
$8,000.00 
EXHIBIT ^ 
EXHIBIT "B" 
Garland v. Garland 
SG4 
PLAINTIFF'S GROSS INCOME 
YEAR MONTH 
1984 
Not Employed 
1985 
From 1985 Schedule W $7,010.00 $584.16 
1986 
Returned Check Stubs 
1986 W2 is inaccurate 
1987 
$ 5 , 3 0 0 . 0 0 $ 4 4 2 . 0 0 
1987 W2 $ 5 , 4 1 3 . 0 0 $451 .08 
EXHIBITS 
E X H I B I T "t 
Ga r1a nd v. Gar1and 
PLAINTIFFfS MONTHLY EXPENSES 
i-mi- ,i»' mor tgaqe payment 
Red I p roper t"V *" iv I 
Maintenance 
Fi in MI I'm Mi iiispho I if S u p p l i e s 
U t i l i t i e s 
Te3 ephone 
Laundi: ] 15 Clli = i ,i i i: :i gir 
C l o t h i n g 
Medi ca 1 
u e / i t a l 
rp^ . j -ance 
School 
' tilt 
i.*i l a e n t a ^s 
A'. ; r Payni-*--" 
I i s t a I I mi > * ; ia y me n t s 
TOTAL 
25.00 
.00 
^0.00 
400.00 
) 
350.00 
1 ?e,. 00 
200.00 
$3,495.00 
* 
* 
Anticipated 
EXHIBIT C 
EXHIBIT ' D" 
IN THE DISTRICT COURT OF THF THIRD JUDICIAL DISTRICT 
X.N AND FOR SALT LAKF COUNTY, STATE Of si'inn 
* * 1 
JHARON GARLAND, 
» 
v s . 
'AMES KENT GMU.ANH, 
Dei e n d a n t . 
CASE NO. D 8 7 - 7 7 2 
CERTIFIED COPY 
BEFORE THE HONORABLE SCOTT DANIELS 
REPORTh • " INANSCRIH HI I'ltLKJttUJ No' 
F e b r u a r y 1 7 ,
 A. 
EXHIBIT I 
A P P F A \< A N C F S 
22 
t ' T THE PLAINTIFF: CRAIG M. PETERSON 
LITTLEFIELD & PETERSON 
w n f • • l I i I in in • i i • I 4 2 6 n~' 
SALT LAKE CI TV, I-'; r-.H 6 4 1 0 2 
1
 ?•• THE DEFENDANT 
1 
1 
1 
1 
I-" 
1:. 
16 
1 
1 
1 
2r< 
i. ' -*.d f o r 
SALT LAKE C I T Y , UTAH 4 8 1 0 2 
oc 
" 'A IT i.ftKF CITY i r i 'Mi f WEDNESDAY, FF^PflAPY 17 , I^RR 
R e p o II I ii II II Ii I  i '111r f u l l nwi ni | i s a i i 
e x c e r p t tiow I !n j I i i a l Iv M LJII I  he 
a f c l e m e n t i n r . p . i da f f - > 
Q ( 
n e c e s s a r y fo? _ r * •• p p r e c ? n r w 
n c i - - . i n i i | i ' 
A Y e s . 
0 ' And have you i n £ a c t con 11: ac t ed w 11h Li 111 ef i e 1 d 
in II • fill: 1 e t e i " s c i i 1: • : i : e p r e s e i :i t ;; : I :i I: i • s i: • = t c: :i a y 11 11 : o I ::i 11 :i <:: i 1 1 1 1 i <E 
proceedings? 
A Y e s . 
0 Have you a c q u . r - j r. : .- . . 
•' A ' Yes . 
Q h i i d e n t e r i i I • ; r i i 1 1 c E a c • i :i t r a c t f c i p a y .me T 11 o f t! i c • a e 
s e r v i c e s , d i 5 you a g r e e t o pay ai i 1 lour l y r a t e ? 
. A' • Yes , I d i d 
Q •' Wl i a t 1 \o\ i i : II '"> i -i I ' 11 I i M i t r I 11 \ \ ? 
' A $11 0 an I u: >ur 
0 ? ^ ' V •-'; 
A 5 . 
Q Ha^e you r e c e i v e d , c o n s i s t e n t l y , :i::"Ms r~.* ;" 
A V e ^ . 
0 I show you a copy of what has be-:;;, marked as 
3 
P l a i n t i f f ' s I' x I in 11111 I I 11 w i It i i i i • i J u c * r s h e e t a t t a c h e d It. r i t , 
[ i ( i > I III! I i Ill in II II I > I I k III 1,1" i I ( I ) III i III i 1 i " C i l i i f- ' ii 1 1 I III i 1 1 
:* • I O S O bi 1 I s ? 
A , Y e s , • • 
Q . Do t h e y a c c u r a t e l y l e p i e s e n f tLurncyb I.CMS 
J ::^ ia ve i ncu r re d up t en Febur a r y I 7 t ii „ 
A * 
M- ^ETF^^ON: We *'*" *  1 ^^yo f^r t1--' -J . . s s i : of 
r 
N? • no LOW IT. : \*.£. vf r - 'oner . ~ j n ^ t i r / . . Her 
- - -;=f ?.- -- •• - - t I have 
* -ctrx vt.- - . T ; . ^ i -it- * o \. , * , . 'i a . - \ , - f i c i e n t 
foundat-iw., .. • ' . Mr , ' % -• •-- ;*- L-^^". b i ] 1 e d . 
; ] c t = h e • 
u
.3'- be*7.. : ". V J - - - -- - * i ^ i ^ - * t o b a s e 
r - , out u1 i * - j , -<-i- ir ~. i, ^ v- P e t e r s o n 
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I would represent t- ;:> the Court that I am: 
ex p e r i e n c e d i n 11 i e p r a c t i c e o f 1; a w , f o r 1 5 ye a r s a s - Tie mhe r 
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of the Bar charge; -that $3 1 0 for my expertise i J :i the area of 
6 
1 trials before the Court, and significantly in domenstic 
2 relations matters is reasonable; that my time and experience 
3 is certainly comparable to that charged by other members of 
4 my profession in the community. I am aware of others who 
5 charge substantially in excess of that, with the average 
6 rating in the neighborhood of $120 to $130, and some 
7 running as high as $150. 
8 I would assert then that — I can't assert. I am 
9 simply proffering. I would proffer that the $110 is a 
10 reasonable charge when compared with the charges in 
11 the community, and the $30 for paralegal services is 
12 substantially below that which is normally charged in the 
13 community. 
14 THE COURT: Without agreeing that is reasonable 
15 fee, Mr. Dolowitz, would you agree that would be his 
16 testimony if he were called as a witness? 
17 MR. DOLOWITZ: I would. 
18 THE COURT: THANK YOU. 
19 Do you rest, then, Mr. Peterson? 
20 MR. PETERSON: Plaintiff rests, your Honor. 
21 I * * * * * 
22 
23 
24 
25 
REPORTER'S CERTIFICATE 
STATE OF UTAH ) 
: SS. 
SALT LAKE COUNTY ) 
I, NORA S. WORTHEN, an official court reporter for the 
Third Judicial District Court in and for Salt Lake County, 
State of Utah, do hereby certify that I reported 
stenographically the proceedings in the matter of SHARON 
GARLAND VS. JAMES K. GARLAND, Case No. D87-772, and that 
the above and foregoing is a true and correct transcript of 
said proceedings, as requested be transcribed, as 
reported by me at the time of trial. 
Dated this 15th day of 
y/
^A 
( 
Nora 
Utah 
August 1988. 
^uS ^M^^ 
S. worthen, CSR, RPR, CP 
License No. 205 
t 
8 
EXHIBIT "E" 
Garland v. Garland 
PLAINTIFF'S ATTORNEYS FEES 
Balance as of 2/16/88 $7,740.94 
Payments Received 1,500.00 
TOTAL $ 9 , 2 4 0 . 9 4 
SG2 
EXHIBIT E 
EXHIBIT , fF , f 
1 
2 
3 
4 
5 
6 
7 
8 
9 
10 
11 
12 
13 
14 
15 
16 
17 
18 
19 
20 
21 
22 
23 
24 
25 
> > 
IN THE THIRD JUDICIAL DISTRICT COURT 
IN AND FOR SALT LAKE COUNTY, STATE OF UTAH 
* * * * * 
SHARON GARLAND, 
Plaintiff, 
vs. 
JAMES KENT GARLAND, 
Defendant. 
Civil No. D87-772 
REPORTER'S PARTIAL TRANSCRIPT OF PROCEEDINGS 
Ruling on Motion for Protective Order 
February 17, 1988 
BEFORE THE HONORABLE SCOTT DANIELS 
District Court Judge 
A P P E A R A N C E S : 
For t h e P l a i n t i f f : 
For the Defendant: 
For Knutson Mortgage: 
CRAIG M. PETERSON 
LITTLEFIELD & PETERSON 
426 South 500 East 
Salt Lake City, Utah 84102 
DAVID S. DOLOWITZ 
of and for 
COHNE, RAPPAPORT & SEGAL 
525 East 100 South, Suite 500 
Salt Lake City, Utah 84102 
DAVID R. BLACK 
VAN COTT, BAGLEY, CORNWALL & 
MC CARTHEY 
50 South Main 
Salt Lake City, Utah 84145 
EXHIBIT F 
FILED Ihi CLEHKS 0FFIC 
Salt Lake City, Utah 
FILMED '"-^ fenntv CJertc 
1 SALT LAKE CITY, UTAH; WEDNESDAY, FEBRUARY 17, 1988; A. M. 
2 (Reporter's Note: The following are 
3 excerpts from the hearing held on the aforementioned date.) 
4 I * * • * • 
5 THE COURT: The matter before the Court this 
6 morning is Sharon Garland vs. James Kent Garland, D87-772. 
7 Is the Plaintiff ready to proceed? 
8 MR. PETERSON: Plaintiff is ready, your Honor. 
9 THE COURT: Is the Defendant ready to proceed? 
10 MR. DOLOWITZ: Defendant is ready, your Honor. 
n THE COURT: All right. You can proceed, Mr. 
12 Peterson. 
13 MR. PETERSON: Your Honor, we have a preliminary 
14 matter. The Plaintiff has a subpoena for Knutson Mortgage 
15 here today. 
16 THE COURT: That is a Motion for Protective Order?| 
17 MR. PETERSON: Yes. And Kir. Black is here to 
18 argue that motion. Apparently the Defendant does not want 
19 the financial application produced, which we have requested 
20 THE COURT: All right. Mr. Black? 
21 MR- BLACK: Thank you, your Honor. 
22 MR. DOLOV7ITZ: I have an additional matter before 
23 he does, and that is that I would raise the question, your 
24 Honor, that at this point discovery is supposed to be 
25 completed under Rule 4 of this Court. There is no discover}! 
23 
1 within 30 days of trial, so I think the Motion for 
2 Protective Order should be granted simply on that basis. 
3 And this is certainly not something — if we were asked to 
4 supply it, we supplied it. If we didn't supply it, we 
5 haven't been asked to. Me didn't supply it to the extent 
6 they are going on continuing with discovery, in violation 
7 of Rule 4. We are opposed to the Subpoena being honored. 
8 I think the Motion to Quash should be granted. 
9 THE COURT: They didn't subpoena them for discover^ 
10 They subpoenaed them to be here at trial to produce the 
H documents for use at trial, right? 
12 MR. PETERSON: That's correct, your Honor. 
13 THE COURT: That's not discovery. 
14 MR. DOLOWITZ: No, that's not correct, your Honor, 
15 because there is a letter that accompanied the Subpoena that 
16 said they could simply give them the documents and then they 
17 would not have to appear. 
18 THE COURT: That's not discovery. I will hear 
19 the Motion for Protective Order, though, but I am going to 
20 deny it on that ground. 
21 You can proceed, Mr. Black. 
22 MR. BLACK: We are really just third-parties in 
here. We have got the documents here. A review of the 
24 I documents revealed they are subject to the federal Financial 
25 Privacy Statute, and I could even give them to you to look 
11 
12 
1 at in camera if you'd like, your Honor. The employer 
2 verification that comes with mortgage applications, the 
3 request for verification of deposit has an attachment on 
4 the federal Privacy Act of 1978. Each of these documents, 
5 with the exception of one, I believe, states that they are 
6 subject to the Financial Privacy Act. We do not have a 
7 release from Mr. Garland to release confidential information!, 
8 Information which was given to Knutson Mortgage in 
9 confidentiality to approve or deny a loan for real property-
10 I THE COURT: You won't have any problem releasing 
them if he would sign a release? You donft want to do it 
unless he does? 
13 I MR. BLACK: Your Honor, to be quite candid, we 
14 find ourselves between a hard spot. If I don't give you the| 
15 records, you find me in contempt of Court. If I give them, 
16 we may be subject to a civil suite for release of confidential 
17 information. We believe whether the Financial Privacy Act 
18 applies or not, there is a common law idea of confidentiality 
19 similar to that on medical records. You serve on the party 
20 a release saying, yes, the Plaintiff will allow you to 
21 release medical records, and you release them. Or you go 
22 down to Court and say, your Honor, these clowns won' t give 
23 us the records. If you order us to give the records, the 
24 doctor is okay. 
25 We feel like we are merely in the same position 
1 right now. We are not meaning to be obstreperous. We just 
2 find ourselves in an "awkward" position. 
3 THE COURT: Do you have a copy of the Federal 
4 Statute with you, by chance? I am not really familiar with 
5 it. 
6 I MR. BLACK: I do not. I only have a copy of the 
7 State Statute. 
8 THE COURT: Essentially the Federal Statute 
9 requires certain documents are confidential unless released 
10 by the person that they relate to; is that essentially 
n what it says? 
12 MR. BLACK: That is — to be perfectly honest, 
13 they say no federal or state agency — the State Statute 
14 says in 78-27-45: 
15 "No person acting in behalf of the state, or 
16 any agency, office, department, bureau or political 
17 subdivision thereof, shall request or obtain, by 
18 subpoena or otherwise, information from a state or 
19 federally chartered financial institution" — 
20 to be perfectly honest, that mirrors our federal language. 
21 I am sure that is where they got that. It mirrors the 
22 federal language, FHA and PUD Financial Privacy Act of 
23 1978. 
24 TKE COURT: Thank you, Mr. Black. 
25 MR. PETERSON: Your Honor, Mr. Garland applied 
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